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The American Religious Landscape and the 2004 Presidential Vote: 
Increased Polarization 
 
 John C. Green, Corwin E. Smidt, James L. Guth, and Lyman A. Kellstedt  
 
The American religious landscape was strongly polarized in the 2004 presidential vote 
and more so than in 2000. Both President Bush and Senator Kerry benefited from strong 
support among key religious constituencies, with only a few religious groups closely 
divided. 
 
Increased polarization is the principal finding of the Fourth National Survey of Religion 
and Politics post-election survey. Other major findings include: 
 
• Mainline Protestants, once a strong Republican constituency, divided their 
votes evenly between Kerry and Bush, producing the highest level of support 
for a Democratic presidential candidate in recent times. 
• Modernist Mainline Protestants and Catholics strongly supported Kerry, 
dramatically increasing their Democratic vote and turnout over 2000.  
• Kerry gained ground among the Unaffiliated compared to 2000, but turnout 
remained unchanged. 
• Bush’s biggest gain came among Latino Protestants, who moved from the 
Democratic column in 2000 to the Republican column in 2004. 
• Non-Latino Catholics, once a bedrock Democratic constituency, gave a 
majority of their votes to Bush. This gain was largely due to increased support 
among Traditionalist Catholics, but Bush also won the crucial swing group of 
Centrist Catholics. 
• Black Protestants and Latino Catholics supported Bush at a higher level than 
in 2000, but were still solidly Democratic. 
• Foreign policy and economic priorities were far more important to the overall 
vote than social issues, such as abortion or same-sex marriage. However, 
social issue priorities were most important to Bush’s religious constituencies. 
In contrast, economic issues were most important to Kerry’s constituencies. 
 
This report is based on the post-election sample of the Fourth National Survey of 
Religion and Politics, conducted November-December 2004 at the University of Akron. 
It had 2,730 re-interviews of surveys conducted in the spring of 2004 (a margin of error 
of plus or minus 2.5 percent; see Appendix for details of the study). 
 
How the Faithful Voted 
 
Table 1 lists eighteen major religious groups that describe the American religious 
landscape, and the two-party presidential vote and estimated turnout for each (see the 
appendix for details on how these categories were defined).   
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Table 1. The American Religious Landscape and the 2004 Two-Party Presidential 
Vote (arranged by Religious Tradition) 
 
              Vote Choice* 
                                                                      Bush   Kerry                     Turnout* 
ALL EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT 78 22 = 100% 63%   
 Traditionalist Evangelical Protestant 88 12 69%   
 Centrist Evangelical Protestant 64 36 52% 
 Modernist Evangelical Protestant 48 52 65% 
 
ALL MAINLINE PROTESTANT 50 50 69% 
 Traditionalist Mainline Protestant 68 32 78% 
 Centrist Mainline Protestant 58 42 68% 
 Modernist Mainline Protestant 22 78 71% 
 
Latino Protestant  63 37 49% 
Black Protestant 17 83 50% 
 
ALL NON-LATINO CATHOLIC 53 47 67% 
 Traditionalist Catholic 72 28 77% 
 Centrist Catholic 55 45 58% 
 Modernist Catholic 31 69 70% 
 
Latino Catholic 31 69 43% 
 
Other Christians 80 20 60% 
 
Other Faiths 23 77 62% 
 
Jews 27 73 87%  
 
ALL UNAFFILIATED 28 72 52% 
 Unaffiliated Believers 37 63 39% 
 Seculars 30 70 55% 
 Atheists, Agnostics 18 82 61% 
 
ENTIRE ELECTORATE 51 49 =100% 60.8% 
 
* Vote choice and turnout weighted to reflect actual election results. Unweighted results show very similar 
patterns. 
 
Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Post-Election Sample (N=2730, 
November-December 2004, University of Akron) 
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Although the election was very close overall (51 percent for Bush and 49 percent for 
Kerry), there was extensive polarization between and within the major religious 
traditions.  
 
An example of polarization between religious traditions is that Evangelical Protestants 
gave Bush more than three-quarters of their votes, while nearly three-quarters of the 
Unaffiliated voted for Kerry. An example of polarization within religious traditions is the 
sharp differences in support for Bush and Kerry among groups of Mainline Protestants 
and Catholics.   
 
Evangelical Protestants. Overall, Evangelical Protestants strongly backed Bush with 78 
percent of their votes, and had a 63 percent turnout.   
 
However, there were important divisions among Evangelicals. Traditionalist Evangelicals 
(highly orthodox beliefs and practices) voted 88 percent for Bush, with a turnout of 69 
percent. Centrist Evangelicals (moderate beliefs and practices) were less supportive, 
voting 64 percent for Bush, with a turnout of 52 percent.  
 
In contrast, Modernist Evangelicals (highly heterodox beliefs and practices) voted on 
balance for Kerry, with 52 percent and had a turnout of 65 percent. This group was one of 
the few closely divided between the candidates. (Indeed, these close results must be 
viewed with some caution because of the small number of respondents.) 
 
Mainline Protestants. Overall, Mainline Protestants divided their votes evenly, with Bush 
and Kerry each receiving 50 percent; their turnout was 69 percent. This result is the 
highest level of support for a Democratic presidential candidate in recent times. 
 
This tie at the ballot box was caused by sharp internal divisions. Traditionalist Mainline 
Protestants voted 68 percent for Bush, with a turnout of 78 percent, and Centrist 
Mainliners backed the President with 58 percent, with a turnout of 68 percent.  
 
In contrast, Modernist Mainline Protestants strongly backed Kerry with 78 percent, and 
had a turnout of 71 percent. 
 
Minority Protestants. Latino Protestants supported Bush with 63 percent of their votes, 
and had a turnout of 49 percent. Black Protestants strongly backed Kerry with 83 percent, 
with a turnout of 50 percent. 
 
Catholics. Overall, Bush won a slim majority of Non-Latino Catholics at 53 percent, with 
a turnout of 67 percent. 
 
Here, too, there were sharp internal divisions. Traditionalist Catholics strongly preferred 
Bush with 72 percent, with a turnout of 77 percent, and Centrist Catholics supported the 
President with 55 percent, with a turnout of 58 percent.  
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In contrast, Modernist Catholics went strongly for Kerry, with 69 percent, and a turnout 
of 70 percent. 
 
Latino Catholics were solidly in the Kerry camp with 69 percent, and had a turnout of 43 
percent. 
 
Other Religious Groups. Other Christians (including Latter Day Saints, Eastern Orthodox 
and other smaller churches) strongly backed Bush with 80 percent, and had a turnout of 
60 percent.   
 
Jews solidly supported Kerry with 73 percent of the vote, and had a turnout of 87 percent.  
And the Other Faiths (Muslims, Hindus, New Age practitioners, and other small groups) 
voted for Kerry with 77 percent, and had a 62 percent turnout. 
 
Unaffiliated. Overall, the Unaffiliated strongly supported Kerry with 72 percent, and had 
a turnout of 52 percent.  
 
Here the internal divisions were not as sharp: Unaffiliated Believers (no affiliation but 
traditional religious beliefs) voted 63 percent for Kerry, but with a very low turnout of 39 
percent; Seculars (no affiliation or traditional beliefs) voted 70 percent for Kerry, with a 
55 percent turnout; and Atheists/Agnostics (self-identified) voted 82 percent for Kerry, 
with a turnout of 61 percent.  
 
The Bush and Kerry Constituencies 
 
Table 2 arrays these eighteen religious groups in order of the Bush and Kerry vote. Each 
candidate had strong support from key constituencies and only a few groups were closely 
divided. 
 
The Bush Constituencies. Four religious groups gave Bush more than two-thirds of their 
votes: Traditionalist Evangelicals (88 percent), Other Christians (80 percent), 
Traditionalist Catholics (72 percent); and Traditionalist Mainline Protestants (68 percent). 
All four of these groups had a turnout of three-fifths or more. 
 
Four additional religious groups gave Bush a majority of their votes:  Centrist 
Evangelicals (64 percent), Latino Protestants (63 percent), Centrist Mainline Protestants 
(58 percent), and Centrist Catholics (53 percent). These groups had lower turnout, 
ranging from less than one-half to two-thirds. 
 
The Kerry Constituencies. Five religious groups gave Kerry about three-quarters or more 
of their votes: Black Protestants (83 percent), Atheists/Agnostics (82 percent), Modernist 
Mainline Protestants (78 percent), Other Faiths (77 percent), and Jews (73 percent). 
Turnout varied considerably among these groups, from a low of one-half to a high of 
nearly nine of ten. 
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Table 2. The American Religious Landscape and the 2004 Two-Party Presidential 
Vote (arranged by Bush and Kerry Vote) 
 
                                                                      Vote Choice* 
                                                                      Bush   Kerry 
Traditionalist Evangelical Protestant 88 12  
Other Christians 80 20 
ALL EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT 78 22 
Traditionalist Catholic 72 28 
Traditionalist Mainline Protestant 68 32 
 
Centrist Evangelical Protestant 64 36 
Latino Protestant  63 37 
Centrist Mainline Protestant 58 42 
Centrist Catholic 55 45 
ALL NON-LATINO CATHOLIC 53 47 
 
ENTIRE ELECTORATE 51 49 =100% 
 
ALL MAINLINE PROTESTANT 50 50  
Modernist Evangelical Protestant 48 52 
Unaffiliated Believers 37 63 
Latino Catholic 31 69 
Modernist Catholic 31 69 
Seculars 30 70 
 
ALL UNAFFILIATED 28 72 
Jews 27 73 
Other Faiths 23 77 
Modernist Mainline Protestant 22 78 
Atheists, Agnostics 18 82 
Black Protestant 17 83 
 
* Vote choice and turnout weighted to reflect actual election results. Unweighted results show very similar 
patterns. 
 
Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Post-Election Sample (N=2730, 
November-December 2004, University of Akron) 
             
 
 
Kerry received majority support from five additional groups: Seculars (70 percent), 
Modernist and Latino Catholics (69 percent each), Unaffiliated Believers (63 percent), 
and Modernist Evangelicals (52 percent). Here, too, turnout varied, from a low of less 
than two-fifths to a high of more than two-thirds. 
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Religious Groups and Party Coalitions in 2004  
 
Table 3 looks at the major party vote coalitions, listing the contribution each of the 
eighteen religious groups made to the total Bush and Kerry vote (each column adds up to 
100 percent; for ease of presentation, Table 2 has the same order of religious groups as 
Table 3.) 
 
Bush depended heavily on traditionalist Christians, while Kerry had a more diverse 
coalition characterized by minority faiths, the Unaffiliated, and modernist Christians. All 
else being equal, the more homogeneous Republican coalition was probably easier to 
mobilize than the more diverse Democratic coalition.  
 
             
 
Table 3. The American Religious Landscape and the 2004 Party Coalitions 
                                                                       
                                                                      Bush    Kerry     All 
Traditionalist Evangelical Protestant  27%   4%   15% 
Other Christians      4   1     3 
Traditionalist Catholic     8   3     6  
Traditionalist Mainline Protestant    8   4     6 
 
Centrist Evangelical Protestant  11   7     9 
Latino Protestant       3   2     2 
Centrist Mainline Protestant     9   7     8 
Centrist Catholic      8   6     7 
 
Modernist Evangelical Protestant    2   3     2 
Unaffiliated Believers      2   4     3 
Latino Catholic      2   4     3 
Modernist Catholic      4   9     6 
Seculars       4 10     7 
 
Jews        1   4     3 
Other Faiths       1   4     2 
Modernist Mainline Protestant    2   9     6 
Atheists, Agnostics      1   6     4 
Black Protestants      3 13     8 
 
ENTIRE ELECTORATE   100% 100%   100% 
 
Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Post-Election Sample (N=2730, 
November-December 2004, University of Akron) 
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The Republican Coalition. The single most important group for Bush was Traditionalist 
Evangelicals, which provided more than one-quarter of his total votes (27 percent). 
Traditionalist Evangelicals supplied more than twice the proportion of Bush ballots than 
any other group. The top four Bush groups combined for nearly one-half of his total 
ballots (47 percent).  
 
Bush’s second most important group was Centrist Evangelicals (11 percent); and the 
second four Bush groups produced almost one-third of his total ballots (31 percent).  
 
The remaining ten groups (which on balance supported Kerry) provided Bush with one-
fifth of his total ballots. But given the closeness of the election, his vote in each of these 
groups was crucial to Bush’s victory. 
 
Looked at another way, all Evangelical Protestants together provided Bush with two-
fifths percent of his total votes, all the traditionalist Christians combined for more than 
two-fifths, and all the centrist Christians more than one-quarter.  
 
The Democratic Coalition. The single most important group for Kerry was Black 
Protestants, which accounted for a little more than one-eighth of his total votes (13 
percent). The top set of five Democratic constituencies (at the very bottom of the table) 
provided Kerry with almost two-fifths of all his ballots (37 percent). 
 
The second most important Kerry group was the Seculars, with one-tenth of his ballots. 
The second set of five Kerry groups provided a little less than one-third of his total votes 
(30 percent). 
 
The eight remaining groups (which on balance supported Bush) provided one-third of 
Kerry’s total votes, with the bulk of this support coming from the three Centrist groups. 
Even modest gains among these categories could have given Kerry a majority of the two-
party vote. Indeed, the Kerry ballots from the top four Bush constituencies were nearly as 
numerous as the contribution made by Black Protestants (12 versus 13 percent), and the 
Kerry votes from Traditionalist Evangelicals were as important to his total as the Jewish 
vote (4 percent each). 
 
Thus, the Democratic coalition was quite diverse: Black Protestants and Latinos together 
accounted for one-fifth of Kerry’s ballots, and this proportion was matched by the 
Unaffiliated, Non-Latino Catholics, and Mainline Protestants.  
 
Comparison to the 2000 Election 
 
Table 4 reports the changes in presidential vote and turnout between 2000 and 2004 for 
the eighteen religious groups (for ease of presentation, the religious groups follow the 
order in Table 2).  
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Evangelical Protestants. Evangelical Protestants strongly backed Bush in both years, but 
their support increased by about 6 percentage points (from 74 to 78 percent). At the same 
time, their turnout grew by 9 percentage points (from about 54 to 63 percent).  
 
        
 
Table 4. The American Religious Landscape and Change in Voting Behavior 2000-
2004 
                                                                    Change in     Change in     Change in                                                
                                                                    Bush Vote*   Dem. Vote   Turnout 
 
Traditionalist Evangelical Protestant +  4% -  4% +  7 
Other Christians +12               -12 +  7  
ALL EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT + 4 -  4 +  9 
Traditionalist Catholic +17 -17 +12  
Traditionalist Mainline Protestant     0     0 +14 
 
Centrist Evangelical Protestant +  3 -  3 +  2    
Latino Protestant  +31 -31 +11   
Centrist Mainline Protestant +  1               -  1 +15    
Centrist Catholic +11 -11 +  4   
ALL NON-LATINO CATHOLIC + 5 -  5 +11 
 
ENTIRE ELECTORATE +  1 -  1 +10 
 
ALL MAINLINE PROTESTANT -10 +10 +11 
Modernist Evangelical Protestant    0     0 +23 
Unaffiliated Believers -  5  -  5 - 10   
Latino Catholic + 7  -  7 +17   
Modernist Catholic -12  +12 +21   
Seculars -  3  -  3 +  9   
 
ALL UNAFFLIATED  -  5     +  5     0 
Jews     0      0 +15   
Other Faiths -   5  +  5  -  7   
Modernist Mainline Protestant - 23  +23 +13 
Atheists, Agnostics - 12  +12  -  7    
Black Protestants +12  - 12     0    
 
* “+” indicates an increase over 2000 and “-“ a decrease over 2000.. 
    
Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Post-Election Sample (N=2730, 
November-December 2004, University of Akron) and Third National Survey of Religion 
and Politics, Post-Election Sample (N=3000, November-December 2000, University of 
Akron). 
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The increase in Bush support occurred among Traditionalist and Centrist Evangelicals (4 
and 3 percentage points, respectively).  In contrast, the Democratic leanings of Modernist 
Evangelicals were unchanged, but a 23 percentage point increase in turnout favored 
Kerry. 
 
Overall, the total share of Bush’s vote from Evangelicals in 2004 was the same as in 2000 
(40 percent); the Evangelical share of the Kerry ballots was 14 percent, up slightly from 
Gore’s 13 percent in 2000. 
 
Mainline Protestants. The most dramatic change occurred among Mainline Protestants, 
where Bush’s support fell sharply by 10 percentage points (60 to 50 percent) and turnout 
expanded by 11 percentage points (from 58 to 69 percent). This represents the largest 
support for a Democratic presidential candidate in recent times.  
 
Traditionalist and Centrist Mainline Protestants voted for Bush at about the same rate as 
in 2000, so the overall change came almost entirely from Modernist Mainliners. Kerry 
gained 23 percentage points from this group and its turnout expanded by 13 percentage 
points. The result was stronger polarization within the Mainline Protestant community. 
 
In essence, the Modernist Mainliners more closely matched their views on economic and 
foreign policy to their vote. For instance, 90 percent of Mainline Protestants who felt the 
Iraq War was unjustified voted for Kerry, as did three-quarters of those who opposed 
Bush’s tax-cut policy. 
 
The total share of Bush’s vote from Mainline Protestants declined from 22 percent in 
2000 to 19 percent in 2004; Kerry’ proportion rose to 20 percent over Gore’s 14 percent 
in 2000. 
 
Minority and Other Christians.  Bush made substantial gains among Latino Protestants, 
shifting this group from the Democratic column in 2000 to the Republican column in 
2004. He also made more modest gains among Black Protestants, Latino Catholics, and 
the Other Christians. All of these groups increased their turnout except for Black 
Protestants. 
 
In some respects, Bush’s improvement among the minority faiths represents a reduction 
in political polarization. However, there is some evidence that these gains were 
concentrated among the most traditionally religious, a result which fits the traditionalist-
modernist division among Evangelicals, Mainliners, and Non-Latino Catholics.  
 
As a consequence, the share of the Bush vote from Black Protestants and Latinos 
increased to 8 percent from 3 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, the share of Kerry’s vote from 
Black Protestants and Latinos fell to 19 percent from Gore’s 22 percent in 2000. 
 
Non-Latino Catholics. Bush improved among Non-Latino Catholics by 5 percentage 
points (48 to 53 percent), and turnout expanded by 11 percentage points (56 to 67 
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percent). In fact, Bush essentially broke even with Kerry in the overall Catholic vote, a 
historic achievement for a Republican presidential candidate. 
 
Bush’s gains occurred among Traditionalist and Centrist Catholics (an increase of 17 and 
11 percentage points, respectively). Centrist Catholics were a key swing group in the 
campaign and Bush’s win among them was crucial. 
 
However, Bush lost substantial ground among Modernist Catholics. Here, support for 
Kerry rose 12 percentage points and turnout by 21 percentage points. Thus polarization 
increased within the Catholic community as well. 
 
The share of the total Bush vote from Non-Latino Catholics increased slightly over 2000 
(20 to 19 percent in 2000); the Catholic share of the total Kerry vote declined slightly 
over Gore in 2000 (18 to 21 percent).  
 
Non-Christians and the Unaffiliated. Compared to 2000, the Jewish vote was largely 
unchanged. Bush lost ground among the Other Faiths and also among the Unaffiliated 
(about five percentages point for each). However, turnout varied a good bit: Seculars 
voted at a higher rate (up 9 percentage points), while the Other Faiths (down 7), 
Atheists/Agnostics (down 7), and Unaffiliated Believers (down 10) voted at a lower rate. 
  
The Impact of Issues on Voting Decisions 
 
Table 5 reports the impact of issues on the 2004 presidential vote across the religious 
landscape (for ease of presentation, Table 5 has the same order of groups as Table 2.)  
 
The respondents were asked two questions about the impact of issues on their voting 
decision. First, they were asked the relative importance (“very,” “somewhat,” and “not 
very important”) of three kinds of issues, and then which of the three was the most 
important when they cast their ballot. The three topics were: social issues (such as 
abortion and same-sex marriage); foreign policy (such as the war in Iraq and on 
terrorism), and economic issues (such as jobs and taxes).     
   
Two pairs of numbers for each type of issue are presented in Table 5: the percent 
claiming the issue was very important to their vote and then the percentage claiming it 
was most important. These data reveal considerable complexity in the issue agenda of all 
the religious groups.   
 
Social Issues. Overall, social issues rated third in terms of relative importance (49 percent 
“very important”) and top priority (24 percent “most important”). 
 
However, a majority of the top four Bush constituencies regarded social issues as very 
important to their vote, exceeding the figure for the entire sample. Each of these groups 
was also more likely to choose social issues as most important. Here Traditionalist 
Evangelicals stand out in giving social issues top priority. 
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Table 5. The American Religious Landscape, Issues, and the 2004 Presidential Vote 
 
                                                                      Social Issues     Foreign Policy    Economic Issues 
                                                                        Important             Important           Important 
                                                                    %Very %Most*   %Very %Most   %Very %Most 
 
Traditionalist Evangelical Protestant 78 47 75 29 44 17  
Other Christians 67 38 86 31 61 22  
ALL EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT 68 37 78 31 48 23  
Traditionalist Catholic 68 39 81 31 49 23 
Traditionalist Mainline Protestant 55 30 79 29 54 28 
 
Centrist Evangelical Protestant 55 21 80 33 53 32 
Latino Protestant  54 33 71 11 54 44  
Centrist Mainline Protestant 33 14 80 42 55 39 
Centrist Catholic 24 10 80 42 54 41 
ALL NON-LATINO CATHOLIC 39 19 81 40 56 34 
 
ENTIRE SAMPLE 49 24 80 35 58 33 
 
ALL MAINLINE PROTESTANT 43 19 80 38 57 34  
Modernist Evangelical Protestant 43 30 85 36 55 21 
Unaffiliated Believers 46 26 86 26 65 42 
Latino Catholic 40 21 74 26 71 44  
Modernist Catholic 31 11 82 46 65 36 
Seculars 36 17 80 52 60 27 
 
ALL UNAFFLIATED 38 17 82 32 63 45 
Jews 49   8 88 50 69 29 
Other Faiths 41 18 86 60 55 14 
Modernist Mainline Protestant 44 18 85 37 64 35 
Atheists, Agnostics 38 11 81 54 61 27 
Black Protestant 50 17 78 14 81 60 
 
*Neither the columns nor the rows add to 100% because some categories have been excluded, such as 
respondents who said an issue was “somewhat” or “not important” or respondents who gave top priority to 
other issues. 
 
Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Post-Election Sample (N=2730, 
November-December 2004, University of Akron) 
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The relative importance of social issues drops quickly for the rest of the religious groups, 
generally falling below the entire sample on both measures. Partial exceptions are 
Centrist Evangelicals, Latino and Black Protestants, who match or exceed the entire 
sample on the relative importance of social issues. (Latino Protestants also exceed the 
sample on social issues as most important, with 33 percent.) 
 
Modernist Catholics, Seculars, and Atheists/Agnostics gave the least priority to social 
issues.  
 
These figures suggest that social issues were quite important to the Bush vote, but a 
secondary factor for the electorate as a whole. 
 
Foreign Policy. Foreign policy was rated as “very important” to the votes of 80 percent 
of the entire sample, and reported as the “most important” for 35 percent. Both of these 
figures are far greater than for social issues.  
 
However, there is very little variation in relative importance of foreign policy across the 
religious landscape, with the highest group scoring 88 percent (Jews) and the lowest 71 
percent (Latino Protestants). 
 
There is more variation on listing foreign policy as a top priority. The groups doing so 
were concentrated among Kerry’s religious constituencies, including the Other Faiths, 
Atheists/Agnostics, Jews, Seculars, and Modernist Catholics.  
 
But the groups least concerned with foreign policy are also found among the Kerry 
supporters: Black Protestants, Latino Catholics, and Unaffiliated Believers.  
 
However, the single lowest group in this regard was Latino Protestants, a Bush 
constituency in 2004. Traditionalist Evangelical and Mainline Protestants also gave less 
priority to foreign policy. 
 
Thus, foreign policy issues produced less clear-cut divisions across the religious 
landscape, despite being the most salient issue to the electorate as a whole. 
 
Economic Issues.  Overall, 58 percent of the entire sample said economic issues were 
very important to their vote, and 33 percent said it was top priority. So, economic issues 
ranked second, behind foreign policy and ahead of social issues. 
 
Most Kerry constituencies reported that economic issues were very important to their 
vote, including Black Protestants (81 percent), Latino Catholics (71 percent), Other 
Faiths (69 percent), Modernist Catholics and Unaffiliated Believers (65 percent each). By 
and large, these groups also gave the economy top priority as well. 
 
In contrast, the Bush constituencies were less concerned with the economy in both 
regards. However, here the Other Christians, Latino Protestants, and Centrist Catholics 
were exceptions. 
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Thus, economic issues were important to Kerry’s strongest backers, presenting a contrast 
to social issues, which were a priority among the top Bush supporters.  
 
The Direct Impact of Faith on the Vote 
 
Table 6 reports the results of a question on the direct impact of faith the 2004 vote across 
the religious landscape: 
 
Which of the following statements best describes the relationship of your religious faith 
to your voting decision in 2004? 
 
My faith was more important to my voting decision than other factors 
My faith was about as important to my voting decision as other factors 
My faith was less important to my voting decision than other factors 
My faith was not at all important to my voting decision 
 
Overall, 21 percent of the entire sample reported that faith was “more important than 
other factors” and 26 percent said it was “about as important as other factors” in their 
voting decisions (for a total of 47 percent). Another 15 percent said faith was “less 
important than other factors” and 38 percent said faith was “not at all important” in their 
voting decisions (for a total of 53 percent). 
 
With two exceptions, a majority of Bush’s religious constituencies claimed their faith 
was more or about as important as other factors in their voting decision. Here 
Traditionalist Evangelicals ranked first (56 percent said faith was more important than 
other factors). The exceptions were Centrist Catholics (38 percent) and Centrist Mainline 
Protestants (31 percent). 
 
With one exception, a majority of Kerry’s religious constituencies reported that their faith 
was less important or not at all important to their voting decisions. Atheists/Agnostics 
rated first (76 percent), followed by Seculars (69 percent), and Unaffiliated Believers (57 
percent). Modernist Catholics (53 percent) and Mainline Protestants (51 percent) and 
Jews (49 percent) also had high numbers in this regard. The exception was Black 
Protestants, where more than one-half reported faith to be more or about as important as 
other factors in their voting decisions. 
 
These findings further illustrate the polarization of the religious landscape in the 2004 
presidential vote. 
 
 14
             
 
Table 6. The American Religious Landscape and the Role of Faith in 2004 
Presidential Vote 
                                                                        COMPARED TO OTHER FACTORS:  
                                                                    Faith More   Faith About    Faith Less   Faith Not 
                                                                     Important    as Important    Important   Important 
                                               
Traditionalist Evangelical Protestant 56 31   6   7 =100%  
Other Christians 39 21   8 32 
ALL EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT 42 29   9 20 
Traditionalist Catholic 32 43 10 15 
Traditionalist Mainline Protestant 24 40 16 20 
 
Centrist Evangelical Protestant 25 31 12 32 
Latino Protestant  40 25   8 27 
Centrist Mainline Protestant   8 30 22 40 
Centrist Catholic   5 26 23 46 
ALL NON-LATINO CATHOLIC 11 27 21 41 
 
ENTIRE SAMPLE 21 26 15 38 
 
ALL MAINLINE PROTESTANT   9 30 19 42  
Modernist Evangelical Protestant 10 31 12 32 
Unaffiliated Believers 16 17 11 56 
Latino Catholic 19 20 15 46 
Modernist Catholic   3 18 27 52 
Seculars   3 11 17 69 
 
ALL UNAFFILIATED   7 13 11 69 
Jews   5 20 26 49 
Other Faiths 13 20 25 42 
Modernist Mainline Protestant   4 21 24 51 
Atheists, Agnostics   5   9 10 76 
Black Protestant 30 26 13 31 
 
Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Post-Election Sample (N=2730, 
November-December 2004, University of Akron) 
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APPENDIX 
Data and Methods  
 
The Surveys. This report is primarily based on the Fourth National Survey of Religion 
and Politics, conducted by the Bliss Institute at the University of Akron. The survey was 
a national random sample of adult Americans (18 years or older), conducted in March, 
April, and May of 2004. The total number of cases was 4,000 and the margin of error is 
plus or minus two percent. In November and December of 2004, 2,730 cases were re-
interviewed; the margin of error is 2.5 percent. The pre-election report can be found at 
www.uakron.edu/bliss/research.php. Voter turnout was estimated by weighting reported 
turnout to match overall national turnout among vote eligible population. Similar surveys 
were taken in the spring of 1992, 1996, and 2000. All of these surveys were supported by 
grants from the Pew Charitable Trusts, and in 2004, by the Pew Forum on Religion & 
Public Life.  
 
Defining the Religious Landscape. The eighteen categories used in this report were 
derived from measures of religious belonging, believing, and behaving. (For more details 
on the construction of these measures, contact John Green, the Bliss Institute, 
green@uakron.edu.) 
 
The first step was to use the detailed denominational affiliation collected in the survey to 
sort respondents into religious traditions. Ambiguous categories (such as “just a 
Christian”) were sorted with the aid of other religious measures.  
 
Latino Protestants and Catholics and Black Protestants were then placed in separate 
categories because of their religious and political distinctiveness.  
 
The remaining portions of three major traditions were then broken into traditionalists, 
centrists, and modernists based on three sets of measures. First, six belief measures 
(belief in God, belief in an afterlife, views of the Bible, the existence of the devil, 
evolution, and the truth of all the world’s religions) were combined into a single scale 
running from the most traditional beliefs to the most modern. This measure allowed for a 
great deal of nuance. Second, five measures of religious behavior (worship attendance, 
financial support of a congregation, private prayer, scripture reading, and participation in 
small groups) and the salience of religion were combined into a single scale running from 
the lowest to highest level of religious engagement. 
 
Third, scales measuring identification with religious traditionalist and modernist religious 
movements were constructed. For evangelical Protestants, traditionalists were those who 
claimed to be fundamentalist, evangelical, Pentecostal, or charismatic, and those without 
movement identification who agreed in preserving religious traditions. Modernists were 
those who claimed to be liberal or progressive, ecumenical or mainline and those without 
a movement identification who agreed in adopting modern religious beliefs and practices. 
 
For mainline Protestants and Catholics, traditionalists were those who claimed to be 
“traditional or conservative” in the context of movement identification and those without 
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movement identification who agreed in preserving religious traditions. Modernists were 
those who claimed to be liberal or progressive in the context of movement identification 
and those without a movement identification who agreed in adopting modern religious 
beliefs and practices. 
 
For the three largest religious traditions (white evangelical and mainline Protestants and 
non-Latino Catholic), the belief, behavior and movement scales were combined and then 
divided into three groups. Although the cut-points were slightly different in each of the 
major tradition (reflecting their special circumstances), the traditionalists scored high on 
all three scales—identifying with traditionalist religious movements, having traditional 
beliefs, and a high level of religious engagement. The modernists identified with 
modernist religious movements and had a high level of modern beliefs (religious 
engagement made less difference in defining modernists, but overall modernists had 
longer levels of religious engagement). Centrists were members of each tradition that did 
not fall into the traditionalist or modernist groups.  
 
Finally, the respondents who reported no religious affiliation were subdivided on the 
basis of belief. The Unaffiliated Believers were those with the same level of belief as the 
Centrists in the three largest traditions. Atheists and Agnostics were defined by self-
identification, and the Seculars were the residual category. 
 
While these categories are certainly not definitive, they do capture important regularities 
across the American religious landscape. Table 7 lists the size of the original categories 
and the partisanship of the groups; Table 8 illustrates the content of these categories by 
looking at three important measures of religiosity: worship attendance, views of God, and 
views of traditional beliefs and practices. 
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Table 7.The Religious Landscape and Self-Identified Partisanship, Spring 2004 
 
                                               Percent                            Partisanship* 
                                             Population      Republican  Independent Democratic 
ALL                                        100.0%   38% 20 42    = 100% 
 
Evangelical Protestant 26.3 56% 17 27 
 Traditionalist Evangelical   12.6 70% 10 20  
 Centrist Evangelical   10.8 47% 22 31    
 Modernist Evangelical     2.9 30% 26 44 
 
Mainline Protestant 16.0 44% 18 38 
 Traditionalist Mainline     4.3 59% 10 31 
 Centrist Mainline     7.0 46% 21 33 
 Modernist Mainline     4.7 26% 20 54 
 
Latino Protestants     2.8 37% 20 43 
Black Protestants     9.6 11% 18 71 
 
Catholic 17.5 41% 15 44 
 Traditionalist Catholic     4.4 57% 13 30 
 Centrist Catholic     8.1 34% 19 47 
 Modernist Catholic     5.0 38% 11 51 
 
Latino Catholic     4.5 15% 24 61 
 
Other Christian     2.7 42% 36 22 
Other Faiths     2.7 12% 33 55 
Jewish      1.9 21% 11 68 
 
Unaffiliated 16.0 27% 30 43 
 Unaffiliated Believers     5.3 28% 37 35 
 Secular     7.5 29% 27 44 
 Atheist, Agnostic     3.2 19% 27 54     
 
* Partisan “leaners” included with Republicans and Democrats; minor party affiliation 
included with independents. 
 
Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University 
of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000). 
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Table 8. Defining the Religious Landscape: Measures of Religion 
 
                                              Worship Attendance:         View of God:                   View of Tradition: 
                                             Regular  Often  Rarely  Personal Impersonal Unsure  Preserve Adapt Adopt      
ENTIRE SAMPLE 43% 32 25 40% 41 19 45% 40   15  
 
Evangelical Protestant   
Traditionalist Evangelical 87% 11   2 89% 11   0 78% 18     2 
Centrist Evangelical 36% 41 23 60% 37   3 48% 43     9 
Modernist Evangelical 23% 46 31 12% 56 32 30% 42   28 
 
Mainline Protestant 
Traditionalist Mainline 59% 33   8 75% 24   1 61% 35     4 
Centrist Mainline 33% 45 22 28% 55 17 33% 53   14 
Modernist Mainline 19% 46 35   4% 58 38   3% 62   35 
 
Latino Protestants 63% 31   6 57% 33 10 57% 29  14 
Black Protestants 57% 33 10 54% 44   2 43% 38  19 
 
Catholic 
Traditionalist Catholic 87% 11   2 56% 44   0 65% 32   3 
Centrist Catholic 45% 36 20 34% 59   7 29% 55 16 
Modernist Catholic 21% 49 30   4% 56 40   3% 66 31 
 
Latino Catholic 47% 41 12 35% 55 10 44% 31 25 
 
Other Christian 57% 28 15 43% 43 14 63% 28   9 
Other Faiths 40% 35 25 12% 62 26 37% 43 20 
Jewish  24% 49 27 10% 45 45 37% 46 17 
 
Unaffiliated 
Unaffiliated Believers   9% 33 58 15% 70 15 NA NA NA 
Secular   1% 20 79   2% 28 70 NA NA NA 
Atheist, Agnostic   1% 16 83   0%   5 95 NA NA NA 
 
Legend: Worship attendance: “regular”: weekly or more; “often”: 1-2 a month; few times a year; 
“rarely”: seldom or never; View of God: “Personal”: God is a person; “Impersonal”: God is a spirit or 
force; “Unsure”: not sure or doesn’t believe in God; View of Tradition: “Preserve”: strive to preserve 
beliefs/practices; “Adapt”: strive to adapt beliefs/practices to new times; “Adopt”: strive to adopt new 
beliefs/practices; NA: Not asked. 
              
  
 
